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We examine how the structure of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs’) activity affects technology 
spillovers between MNEs and their host economies by using firm-level data of Japanese MNEs 
and patent citations data. We construct new measures of foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
exploiting information on sales and purchases of foreign affiliates of MNEs. Pure horizontal 
(vertical) FDI is defined as FDI with a high share of transactions (i.e., both purchases of inputs 
and sales of outputs) in the local market (with the home country). Partially horizontal and 
vertical FDI are also defined. We then estimate the effects of these types of FDI on technology 
spillovers captured by patent citations. Our findings reveal that when developed economies host 
Japanese MNEs, pure vertical FDI has significantly positive effects on technology spillovers in 
both directions. When developing economies host Japanese MNEs, by contrast, no form of FDI 
significantly facilitates technology spillovers in either direction. 
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade are two major channels of international tech-
nology spillovers (Keller, 2004, 2009). While a number of empirical studies conﬁrm signiﬁcant tech-
nology spillover eﬀects through imports, empirical ﬁndings on technology spillover eﬀects through FDI
are mixed. In particular, there is relatively little evidence of technological spillovers from inward FDI
to the host country’s ﬁrms in the same industry. For example, Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007)
examine the situation in the United Kingdom and ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive technology spillovers from
FDI. Keller and Yeaple (2009) also provide similar results for the United States. By contrast, Aitken
and Harrison (1999) and Haddad and Harrison (1993) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant or only weak technology
spillovers from FDI for developing countries hosting FDI (the former analyzes the case of Venezuela
and the latter the case of Morocco).1 Todo (2006) and Todo and Miyamoto (2006) ﬁnd that research
and development (R&D) activities play an important role in technological spillovers from FDI to local
ﬁrms in the same industry. That is, a positive, statistically signiﬁcant spillover eﬀect is observed only
for R&D-performing foreign ﬁrms (in Indonesia) or foreign ﬁrms’ R&D stock (in Japan). In contrast,
a number of studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant technological spillovers from inward FDI to the host country’s
upstream ﬁrms through backward linkages. These studies include Javorcik (2004) for the case of
Lithuania, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) for the case of Romania, and Blalock and Gertler (2008)
for the case of Indonesia.2 Moreover, Branstetter (2006) and Singh (2007) ﬁnd evidence of technol-
ogy spillovers from outward FDI. That is, ﬁrms investing in foreign countries acquire technological
knowledge from other ﬁrms in the host countries.
When a ﬁrm establishes business enterprises in two or more countries through FDI, it becomes
a multinational enterprise (MNE). Although actual patterns of FDI are very complex, the types of
FDI and MNE’s activities have been usually categorized into horizontal and vertical.3 Horizontal FDI
replicates a subset of the production process in foreign countries to serve local markets (Markusen,
1984, 1995; Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000; Brainard, 1993, 1997; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple,
2004). It is often motivated by a desire to reduce transportation costs. In contrast, vertical FDI
involves geographicalfragmentationof the production process and is often motivated by a desire to take
advantage of factor cost diﬀerentials (Helpman, 1984, 1985; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Venables,
1999). Recently, Yeaple (2003a) proposed a model in which horizontal, vertical, and complex (i.e., both
1Aitken and Harrison (1999) also ﬁnd negative spillover eﬀects of FDI on the productivity of domestically owned
plants in Venezuela.
2However, Keller (2009) argues that some issues such as a measurement problem in contractual payment between
the MNEs and local ﬁrms may lead to estimation bias. Barrios, Gorg, and Strobl (2009) also argue that the measures
of backward linkages used in recent studies on spillovers are potentially problematic. Using the standard measures
employed in the literature, they fail to ﬁnd robust evidence for spillovers through backward linkages. When they use
alternative measures of backward linkages, on the other hand, they ﬁnd robust evidence for positive FDI backward
spillover eﬀects.
3See Markusen (1995, 2002), Markusen and Maskus (2003), and Helpman (2006) for the survey of the literature.
2horizontal and vertical) FDI arises endogenously. Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006) also analyze
MNEs’ integration strategies that may involve horizontal and vertical FDI simultaneously. A number
of empirical studies give support to the predictions for horizontal FDI. For example, Brainard (1993,
1997) ﬁnds evidence of horizontal FDI but little evidence of vertical FDI. Markusen and Maskus (2002)
argue that a large proportion of FDI is taken place among developed countries and is characterized by
the horizontal type. Looking at the location decisions of MNEs, however, Yeaple (2003b) and Hanson,
Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005) ﬁnd evidence that is consistent with comparative advantage.
Alfaro and Charlton (2009) have recently shown that the share of vertical FDI is much higher
than previously thought, even within developed countries. They argue that a signiﬁcant amount of
vertical FDI has been misclassiﬁed as horizontal in the previous studies. They ﬁnd that a substantial
amount of vertical FDI between developed countries emerge in high-skill sectors because parent ﬁrms
own the stages of production proximate to their ﬁnal production and source raw materials and inputs
in low-skill production stages from outside of the ﬁrm.
Because most of the world’s technology creation occurs in only a handful of developed countries,
the pattern of worldwide technology changes is determined in large part by international technology
spillovers (Keller, 2009). Consequently, the structure of MNEs’ activity between developed countries
may play a very important role in international technology spillovers.
Some recent studies have utilized patent citations data to investigate whether FDI plays any role
in international technology spillovers.4 In these studies, the term “technology spillovers” refers to “the
process by which one inventor learns from the research outcomes of others’ research projects and is able
to enhance her own research productivity with this knowledge without fully compensating the other
inventors for the value of this learning” (Branstetter, 2006: 327–328). Branstetter (2006) analyzes
ﬁrm-level data of Japanese MNEs in the United States and patent citations at the US Patent and
Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) and ﬁnds evidence that FDI facilitates technology spillovers both from
investing ﬁrms to local ﬁrms in the host country and from local ﬁrms to investing ﬁrms. Although he
examine whether diﬀerent types of FDI, such as acquisition, greenﬁeld investment, and R&D facilities,
have diﬀerent eﬀects on spillovers, he does not distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI. Using
patent citations data at the USPTO and the originally created parent-subsidiary database for MNEs
investing in 30 countries, Singh (2007) also ﬁnds signiﬁcant technology spillovers both from MNEs
to the host country and from the host country to MNEs. In technologically advanced countries,
knowledge outﬂows to foreign MNEs on average exceed knowledge inﬂows to the host country. Even
in technologically less advanced countries, knowledge inﬂows from foreign MNEs to the host country
are only slightly stronger than knowledge outﬂows. He does not distinguish among diﬀerent types of
4In the literature, patent citations data are used as a proxy for spillovers of technological knowledge (Jaﬀe, Trajten-
berg, and Henderson, 1993). There is a growing literature on empirical study of international technological spillovers
based on patent citations (Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg, 1999; Hu and Jaﬀe, 2003; MacGarvie, 2006; Mancusi, 2008; Haruna,
Jinji, and Zhang, 2010; Jinji, Zhang, and Haruna, 2010).
3FDI.
In this paper, we attempt to combine a comprehensive ﬁrm-level dataset for the business activities
of MNEs’ foreign aﬃliates and information on the patent citations between MNEs and their host
countries to identify how the structure of MNEs’ activity in terms of horizontal and vertical FDI
aﬀects the technology spillovers between MNEs and host countries. Following Branstetter (2006), we
deﬁne “technology spillovers” as the eﬀects on the research productivity from the outcomes of others’
research activities without full compensation for the value of research productivity enhancement.5
We use ﬁrm-level data of Japanese ﬁrms’ FDI and patent citations at the USPTO and Japanese
Patent Oﬃce (JPO).6 Our dataset includes information on the sales and purchases of the foreign
aﬃliates, classiﬁed according to the destination and source countries. We exploit this information
to construct new measures of horizontal and vertical FDI based on the shares of the host and home
countries in their transactions. In particular, we deﬁne a measure of “pure horizontal FDI” as the
extent to which aﬃliates’ purchases of intermediate inputs and sales of ﬁnal goods are concentrated
in the local market. We also deﬁne a measure of “pure vertical FDI” as the extent to which aﬃliates’
purchases of intermediate inputs and sales of ﬁnal goods are linked to the home country. We can also
deﬁne measures of “partially horizontal” and “partially vertical” FDI. We then estimate how diﬀerent
types of FDI aﬀect technology spillovers from Japanese MNEs to the host country and from the host
country to Japanese MNEs. As for the empirical methodology, we follow Branstetter (2006). Since
the dependent variable (i.e., patent citations) is the count data, we utilize a negative binomial model
developed by Hausman et al. (1984). Moreover, to deal with a potential endogeneity problem we also
employ an endogenous switching model discussed by Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2006).
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. We ﬁnd that an increase in the degree of pure vertical FDI
has signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects on technology spillovers captured by patent citations when developed
economies host Japanese MNEs. Spillovers occur in both directions between the MNEs and their host
countries. These positive eﬀects of pure vertical FDI on technology spillovers are robust for diﬀerent
speciﬁcations. Partially vertical FDI (i.e., FDI with a higher share of purchase of intermediate inputs
in the local market and a higher share of sales of outputs to the home country) also has signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀects on technology spillovers from the (high-income) host countries to the MNEs.7 By
contrast, an increase in the degree of pure horizontal FDI has no signiﬁcant eﬀect or signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀects on technology spillovers between Japanese MNEs and their host countries. Partially
5Therefore, our deﬁnition of technology spillovers is narrower than that used in studies on the productivity change
due to FDI or trade. However, we think that our deﬁnition is useful, because it focuses on direct eﬀects and can still
capture an important part of the eﬀects in terms of the contribution to the expansion of the world’s technology frontier.
6We acknowledge that the range of technology spillovers measured in the data may be narrowed, particularly for
developing countries, by using patent citations, because many indigenous ﬁrms in developing countries are not so active
in application of patents.
7The positive eﬀects of partially vertical FDI are not robust when we employ diﬀerent speciﬁcations, although we
do not report the details of the estimated results in this paper.
4horizontal FDI (i.e., FDI with a higher share of purchases from the home country and a higher share
of sales to the local market) has signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects on technology spillovers from the MNEs
to the (high-income) host countries, but the result is not robust for diﬀerent estimations. We also
ﬁnd that when developing economies host Japanese MNEs, no form of FDI signiﬁcantly facilitates
technology spillovers between the MNEs and their host countries. In some estimations, partially
vertical FDI has signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects on technology spillovers in both directions between the
(low-income) host countries and the MNEs. However, the positive eﬀects disappear when the possible
endogeneity problem is controlled. From these results, we conclude that pure vertical FDI plays a
dominant role in technology spillovers in both directions between Japanese MNEs and the high-income
host countries.
Our ﬁndings have important policy implications. We ﬁnd that the type of FDI matters for technol-
ogy spillovers between MNEs and local ﬁrms in host countries. Therefore, whether or not government
policies to attract inward FDI or to encourage outward FDI will successfully enhance technology
spillovers from foreign to domestic ﬁrms depends on how parent ﬁrms organize the activities of their
aﬃliates. However, it is not realistic for governments to tailor policies to attract only speciﬁc types of
FDI. Since our results indicate that FDI with geographical fragmentation of production processes has
positive eﬀects on technology spillovers, policies to induce a harmonization of domestic product stan-
dards with international standards, for example, may be eﬀective in promoting technology spillovers
by facilitating inward investment by foreign ﬁrms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data employed in our analysis.
Section 3 introduces estimation methods. Section 4 provides empirical results. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2D a t a
2.1 Data of patent citations and Japanese ﬁrms’ FDI
Following Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993), Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999) and other studies,
we use patent citations data as a proxy for technology spillovers. The patent citations are collected
from the dataset compiled by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database
for patents at the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO). A new version of the NBER
patent dataset has been extended to 2006.8 This dataset includes the information on the application
date, the country name of the assignee, the main US patent class, and citations made and received for
each patent. From this dataset, we extract information on the patent applications and citations by the
Japanese MNEs and their host countries. We also use the dataset released by the Japanese Institute
of Intellectual Property (JIIP) for the patent applications at the Japanese Patent Oﬃce (JPO) from
8See the website of Bronwyn Hall for the new version of the NBER patent database.
51964 to 2008.9 This dataset covers all information that corresponds to that of the NBER dataset for
Japanese MNEs and their host countries. Because of the truncated problems of citations both in the
datasets of the NBER and the JIIP, we concentrate our analysis on the period before 2003.
Our data for Japanese MNEs’ activities abroad are obtained from the Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Kihon
Chosa (Survey on Overseas Business Activities, hereafter the METI survey) conducted by the Japanese
Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry (METI). This data source provides detailed data on aﬃliate-
level FDI activities, such as the sales and purchases of aﬃliates of Japanese MNEs, classiﬁed by their
destinations and sources, i.e., sales to (or purchases from) the local market, or exports to (or imports
from) the home country and a third country.
The foreign aﬃliates listed in the METI survey are either foreign aﬃliates with at least 10% of
their capital held by a Japanese parent company, or foreign aﬃliates with at least 50% of their capital
held by a foreign subsidiary, which in turn has at least 50% of its capital held by a Japanese parent
company. These aﬃliates exclude those that run businesses such as ﬁnancial banking, insurance, or
real estate in host countries. According to METI, there were approximately 15,000 foreign aﬃliates
that responded to the survey in 2000.10 Table 1 shows the top 30 host economies for Japanese MNEs
in 2000, based on the number of aﬃliates that had completed the METI survey.11 A ss h o w ni nT a b l e
1, the United States attracted the largest number of Japanese ﬁrms’ aﬃliates, followed by China.
Asian economies as well as developed countries are popular host economies for Japanese MNEs.
Our sample covers the period between 1995 and 2003. All countries in which Japanese MNEs have
at least one aﬃliate are included in our sample. Since the countries vary signiﬁcantly in terms of the
number of patent applications made, we divide our sample into two groups according to the number of
USPTO patent applications made by the sample countries during the period between 1995 and 2003.
For Group I, the number of patent applications is larger than 1,000, while it is less than that for Group
II.12 All countries that are categorized into each group are listed in Table A1. Since Group I consists
of high income countries/economies, we call Group I countries/economies “Developed Economies.” In
contrast, since the vast majority of countries/economies that are included into Group II are those in
middle and low income countries, we call Group II countries/economies “Developing Economies.”
We use the Nikkei company code system to link the three data sources and collected the data for
1,445 parent companies which run at least one aﬃliate during the sample period. Among these parent
companies, 279 made at least one citation to USPTO patent applications from 93 countries, while
9See Goto and Motohashi (2007) for the details of JIIP dataset.
10See the website of METI (http://www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/tyo/kaigaizi/index.html) for the details of the
METI survey.
11About 10,100 aﬃliates reported full or partial information on their sales and purchases classiﬁed by the destinations
and the sources in 2000.
12Although the number of USPTO patent applications made by China, India, Russia, and Singapore is more than
1,000 during the period, a large jump in applications is observed after 2000, compared with a very limited number in
the early years for these countries. We therefore categorize those four countries into the second group.
6393 parent companies made at least one citation to JPO patents. At the same time, 301 companies
received at least one USPTO patent citation and 388 parent companies received at least one JPO
patent citation.
Figure 1 shows the USPTO patent citations made (and received) by Japanese parent companies to
(and from) developing economies, developed economies excluding the United States, and the United
States in the sample period from 1995 to 2003. We take a logarithm of the average number of USPTO
citations on the vertical axis. Looking at the number of patent citations for the three groups, we
observe that most are made between Japanese parent companies and developed countries, compared
with relatively smaller citations with developing countries. That is quite consistent with the argument
in Keller (2009). If we use JPO patents, we can observe patterns that are similar to those in Figure 1.
Note that, among the patent applications for USPTO patents in 2000, about 131,000applications (44%
of total applications) come from non-US residents, compared with 35,000 (8% of total applications)
from non-Japanese residents for JPO patents.13 Thus, patent citations collected from USPTO patents
may provide more comprehensive information than those of the JPO patents.
2.2 Types of FDI
In the literature, FDI and MNEs’ activities are usually categorized into horizontal and vertical. In
the empirical studies, there are a number of ways to measure horizontal and vertical FDI.
Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) and Alfaro and Charlton (2009) use the industrial classiﬁcations
to deﬁne the types of FDI. Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001, 2005) utilize the ﬁrm-level data
from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to characterize vertical FDI as intra-ﬁrm ﬂows of
inputs which they observed ﬂowing from parent companies in the United States to aﬃliates abroad.
This method enables them to measure one-way US bilateral intra-ﬁrm trade. Using the same METI
dataset as in this paper, Fukao and Wei (2008) employ the local sales ratio of the aﬃliates, and classify
a local sales ratio that is less than the average ratio into vertical FDI and that larger than the average
r a t i oi n t oh o r i z o n t a lF D I .
An advantage of the METI survey dataset is that it allows us to measure verticaland horizontalFDI
by using information on the sale of outputs and the purchase of inputs by foreign aﬃliates.14 The local
sales ratio and local purchases ratio of foreign aﬃliates of Japanese MNEs are denoted by ShSaHFDI
and ShPuHFDI, respectively. Similarly, the sales and purchases ratios to and from Japan for foreign
aﬃliates of Japanese MNEs are denoted by ShSaVFDI and ShPuVFDI, respectively. Table 2
13See the website of the World Intellectual Property Organization (http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en) for
the patent statistics of patent applications by the patent oﬃces.
14One limitation of the METI survey dataset is, however, that it does not track transactions between foreign aﬃliates
or between foreign aﬃliates and the parent companies. Thus, there may exist some biases for measuring the types of
FDI by using information on sale and purchase because we cannot examine ﬂows within the boundary of a ﬁrm from
our dataset.
7shows the average values of those ratios during the sample period for the subsamples of developed and
developing economies. Looking at the ratios over the years, no evident trend is observed during the
sample period. The table also interestingly shows that the values of ShSaVFDI, which indicates the
vertical structure of sales from foreign aﬃliates, are around 10–12% in developed countries and around
20–22% in developing countries. If we focus on ShPuVFDI (i.e., the vertical structure of purchases
by foreign aﬃliates), on the other hand, the values are around 40–42% in developed countries and
37–40% in developing countries. Thus, in terms of the purchase of inputs, Japanese MNEs engage
in vertical FDI more actively in developed host countries than in developing host countries. This
evidence is consistent with Alfaro and Charlton (2009), who showed that vertical FDI emerges as far
more prevalent between developed countries.
By exploiting information on the horizontal and vertical structures in sales and purchases of foreign
aﬃliates, we construct new indexes of horizontal and vertical FDI, i.e., HFDI, VFDI, PHFDI,a n d
PVFDI, in the following way:
HFDI = ShSaHFDI × ShPuHFDI
VFDI = ShSaVFDI × ShPuVFDI
PHFDI = ShSaHFDI × ShPuVFDI
PVFDI = ShSaVFDI × ShPuHFDI
As is evident from the deﬁnition of the index, HFDI measures the extent to which aﬃliates’ purchases
of intermediate inputs and sales of ﬁnal goods are concentrated in the local market. Thus, HFDI
captures the degree of “pure” horizontal FDI. If HFDI = 1, a foreign aﬃliate makes all purchases
and sales in the local market. However, if HFDI = 0, either or both of purchases and sales of a
foreign aﬃliate are zero in the local market. Note that HFDI = 0 does not necessarily imply that
the foreign aﬃliate engages in vertical activities because there is a possibility of transactions with
third countries. VFDImeasures the extent to which aﬃliates’ purchases of intermediate inputs and
sales of ﬁnal goods are linked to the home country (i.e., Japan). Thus, VFDI captures the degree
of “pure” vertical FDI. On the other hand, PHFDI and PVFDI capture “partially” horizontal and
“partially” vertical FDI, respectively. The value of PHFDIrises if an aﬃliate buys more intermediate
goods from the home country and sells more ﬁnal goods to the local market. Since the structure of
sales is more important to distinguish the type of FDI than the structure of purchases, we consider
that PHFDI measures the degree of “partially” horizontal FDI due to its horizontal sales structure.
Similarly, the value of PVFDI becomes large if an aﬃliate buys more intermediate goods from the
local market and sells more ﬁnal goods to the home country. Since the structure of sales is vertical in
PVFDI, we consider that it measures the degree of “partially” vertical FDI.
We then test whether there are any diﬀerences in the eﬀects on technology spillovers among those
types of FDI.
83 The Empirical Model
In this section, we explain our empirical model. Although the METI survey is conducted every year,
there are many blanks in the data for a particular ﬁrm because in some years certain respondents did
not report to METI. For this reason, we only use a pooled data in our estimation. Thus, we run the
following speciﬁcation as did in Branstetter (2006),
Ci = β1 + α1LPHosti + α2LPParent i + β2FDI i + ui, (1)
where i refers to the aﬃliate i,a n dCi is the number of citations made (or received) by USPTO
(or JPO) patents of the Japanese parent company that owns aﬃliate i.N o t e t h a t Ci = Ci holds
for aﬃliate i and aﬃliate i  if the same parent company owns aﬃliate i and aﬃliate i . We expect
that citations made by Japanese parent companies capture the technology spillovers ﬂowing from the
host countries to Japanese companies, while the citations received reﬂect the ﬂows from Japanese
companies to host countries. FDI i is one of the alternative measures of the FDI types, i.e., HFDI,
VFDI, PHFDI and PVFDI for aﬃliate i.
As indicated in Branstetter (2006), patent citations may rise as the “citable” host inventions
increase. At the same time, the higher absorptive capacity in the home country may also be associated
with a higher ability to understand and exploit external knowledge, and cite more external patents
(Mancusi, 2008). Thus, we use LPParent i and LPHosti, which refer to the logarithm of the count
of the USPTO (or JPO) patent applications made by aﬃliate i’s Japanese parent company and the
host country where the aﬃliate i runs its business, respectively, to proxy the home absorptive capacity
and “citable” host inventions. Note that LPParenti is the same across aﬃliate i for the same parent
company, and LPHosti is the same across aﬃliate i for the same host country.
The focus of interest in (1) will be the coeﬃcient β2. That is, we examine if the types of FDI of
Japanese ﬁrm in host countries have an inﬂuence on patent citations made and received by the ﬁrm.
We also investigate if there is a diﬀerence in the magnitude and sign of the coeﬃcient between the
citations made and received by the home and host countries, and across the types of FDI Japanese
ﬁrms implemented.
Since the observations of a dependent variable (i.e., patent citations) are the count data, we utilize
a standard estimation technique, namely, a negative binomial model discussed in Cameron and Trivedi
(1998), where the data are Poisson process, but more ﬂexible modeling of the variance to account for
overdispersion than the Poisson is allowed. We use this estimation technique to give our basic ﬁndings
and alternative estimation results.
The other challenge of estimating the eﬀects of the types of FDI on technology spillovers arises
from the fact that patent citations may be endogenous in the sense that unobservables in determining
the types of FDI may be correlated with unobservables in determining the citations. At the same
time, certain geographic factors such as distance and language may inﬂuence the citations as well
9as the types of FDI. Neglecting these unobserved or endogenous factors may result in biased and
inconsistent estimators.15 We therefore attempt to use the endogenous switching model discussed in
Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2006) in our empirical analysis. In that model, the citation Ci follows a






so that a log-linear model for the mean of Ci, μi, can be speciﬁed as
log(μi)=β1 + α1LPHosti + α2LPParent i + α3LDisti + α4LGDPi + α5LCosti + β2Di +  i, (3)
where LDisti is the logarithm of the distance between Japan and the host economy of aﬃliate i,
LGDPi is the logarithm of GDP of aﬃliate i’s host economy, LCosti is the logarithm of salary per
employee of aﬃliate i,a n d i is an unobserved heterogeneity term. LGDPi measures the market size
of the host economy and LCosti measures the labor cost of the aﬃliate. Instead of FDI i in Eq. (1),
here we use a dummy Di (DHFDIi, DVFD I i, DPHFDI i,o rDPVFDI i) for types of FDI, which equals
one for a particular type, and zero otherwise. Following Fukao and Wei (2008), we construct the
dummy for a particular type of FDI such that the dummy equals one when the value of an FDI type’s
index (HFDI, VFDI, PHFDI,o rPVFDI) for aﬃliate i is greater than the average value of the
particular FDI type’s index in the full sample, and zero otherwise. We then use a probit model to
examine how a parent ﬁrm determines its FDI type. The logic we use here is that the type decision















where zi is a vector of factors which may inﬂuence the particular type of FDI. As usual, ui ∼ N(0,1)
and ui is independent of  i. In the so-called endogenous switching model, Va r ( i)=σ2, and total
variance is λ2σ2 +1 . I fλ =0 ,Di is considered to be exogenous. Although a Poisson distribution is
used, the variance of Ci is not necessarily equal to the conditional mean and overdispersion is allowed
in this model. Using the normality assumption for  i,w eh a v e
Va r (Ci|xi,D i)=E(Ci| i,x i,D i)[1 + E(Ci| i,x i,D i)(exp(σ
2) − 1)],
where xi is a vector of explanatory variables in Eq. (3) (i.e., LPHosti, LPParent i, LDisti, LGDPi,
LCosti, and the constant term), which implies that if σ  = 0 the model exhibits overdispersion, as we
would expect from the negative binomial model in Eq. (1). (See Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2006)
for more detail.)
15See Kenkel and Terza (2001) and Wooldrige (2002) for treating with endogenous problems.
10Using this approach, we expect that we could control endogenous factors that aﬀect both technol-
ogy spillovers and the structure of MNEs’ activity. In the estimation, following Fukao and Wei (2008),
we include LDisti (distance), LGDPi (market size), and LCosti (labor cost) in zi i nE q .( 4 ) .A m o n g
those variables, the data for salaries and number of employees of foreign aﬃliates are obtained from
the METI survey. The data on distance are measured as kilometers, and collected from the database
of CEPII Research Center. Data on GDP in host countries are obtained from Penn World Tables.
Table A2 shows the descriptive statistics of variables. Table A3 shows the correlations among
variables.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we report our estimation results. We ﬁrst show the basic ﬁndings by the negative
binomial model. We then report the results by the endogenous switching model and discuss whether
the endogeneity issue matters in our analysis. Finally, we discuss the robustness of our ﬁndings by
showing the results of alternative estimations with additional explanatory variables. We also show
the results using JPO patent data, in addition to USPTO data.
4.1 Basic ﬁndings
We ﬁrst estimate Eq. (1) by the negative binomial model. The results are reported in Table 3. The
upper panel of Table 3 shows the estimated results for the subsample of developed economies. We
observe that the estimates of HFDI are signiﬁcant and negative, whereas they are signiﬁcantly positive
for VFDI, both for the citing and cited. As for PHFDI, the estimated coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant
for the citing, and signiﬁcantly positive for the cited. In contrast, the coeﬃcient of PVFDI reveals
signiﬁcant and positive for the citing and insigniﬁcant for the cited.
The lower panel of Table 3 presents the estimated results for the subsample of developing economies.
Unlike the case of the developed economies, only the coeﬃcients for PVFDI show signiﬁcantly pos-
itive, whereas the coeﬃcients of the other types of FDI reveal negative or insigniﬁcant eﬀects on the
citing as well as the cited.
These results show that an increase in the degree of the “pure” vertical FDI has a signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀect on technology spillovers in both directions between Japanese parent companies and
their host countries if Japanese MNEs invest in high-income countries. This implies that vertical
FDI may play a dominant role in technology spillovers with mutual eﬀects in developed economies.
When middle- and low-income countries host Japanese MNEs, on the other hand, an increase in the
“partially” vertical FDI has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the number of patent citations in both
directions between the Japanese parent companies and the ﬁrms in their host countries.
114.2 Estimating with an endogenous switching model
To deal with potential endogeneity issues, we simultaneously estimate an endogenous switching model
described by Eqs. (2) and (3) for technology spillovers and a probit model based on Eq. (4) for
the decision on FDI types. The estimated results are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 shows
the results for the subsample of developed economies and Table 5 shows those for the subsample of
developing economies.
Columns 9 and 11 in Table 5 show that both of LDist and LGDP positively contribute to the
choice of “pure” horizontal FDI (DHFDI) and “partially” horizontal FDI (DPHFDI) for the subsample
of developing economies. As shown in columns 10 and 12 in Table 5, on the other hand, the coeﬃcients
of LDist and LCost turn out to be signiﬁcantly negative for both “pure” vertical FDI (DVFD I)a n d
“partially” vertical FDI (DPVFDI). These results are quite consistent with the ﬁndings in Fukao
and Wei (2008). Thus, horizontal and vertical FDI to developing economies in our sample follow the
standard theory of foreign investments and MNEs. By contrast, we observe diﬀerent patterns for
developed economies (Table 4). In particular, the coeﬃcient of LCost is signiﬁcantly positive for both
“pure” vertical FDI (DVFD I) and “partially” vertical FDI (DPVFDI). This implies that vertical FDI
to developed economies is not motivated by wage cost saving.
In terms of the endogeneity between technology spillovers and the decision on FDI type, the
estimates of ρ in the two tables imply strong signiﬁcance against the null hypothesis in two cases
out of eight estimations for developed economies and all cases for developing economies.16 Thus,
neglecting the endogenous issues may result in biased and inconsistent estimators (Miranda and Rabe-
Hesketh, 2006). The estimations in Table 4 for developed economies reveal that DVFD I based on the
endogenous switching model for both the citing and cited cases provides results that are similar to
those based on the negative binomial model. For DPVFDI, the two models also provide similar
results, suggesting that more local purchases and more sales in Japan may favor Japanese parents
with more technology spillovers from the host economies. As observed for DHFDI and DPHFDI,t h e
estimates turn insigniﬁcant or signiﬁcantly negative for citing. Our ﬁndings imply that, for developed
economies, “pure” vertical FDI is associated with signiﬁcant technology spillovers, even controlling for
endogenous issues. For developing economies, however, the estimated results of the switching model
are insigniﬁcant or signiﬁcantly negative for all types of FDI, suggesting no evidence of positive eﬀects
of FDI on technology spillovers between Japanese parent companies and developing host countries.
4.3 Alternative estimations
To check the robustness of the basic ﬁndings in Section 4.1, we conduct alternative estimations by
adding explanatory variables. We include PROX (technological proximity), CapRatio(capital ratio),
and Close (a dummy for industrial classiﬁcation, which is one for the same sector and zero otherwise).
16ρ is the correlation between  i and λ i + ui in (3), and ρ = λ/
 
2(λ2 +1 ) . ρ is identiﬁed by λ.
12We also include LDist (the logarithm of distance between Japan and host countries) and Ye a rwhich
captures the changes in citations.
Japanese parent companies and ﬁrms in their host countries may increase their citations of each
other just because Japanese parent companies and ﬁrms in their host countries change the focus of their
research activities in ways that bring them “closer” to each other in the technology space (Branstetter,
2006). To control for this issue, we include a measure of technological proximity (PROX)i nt h e








where Fi =( f1i,···,f ki) is a vector of the cumulative count of patents obtained by aﬃliate i’s parent
ﬁrm in kth technical area17 and Fhost,i is a vector of the aggregate count of patens obtained by all
ﬁrms in the host country in which aﬃliate i is located.
The literature on the role of aﬃliate ownership in technology spillovers is limited. There are a
few studies focused on the correlation between productivity and the ownership of aﬃliates. Javorcik
(2004) and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) found that the correlation of productivity with FDI is
stronger if the aﬃliate is only partially, and not fully foreign owned, because joint ownership generates
more technology transfer, and wholly owned aﬃliates employ more sophisticated technology that is
out of reach of the average domestic supplier. As indicated by Keller (2009), however, the technology
gap may be a key reason for diﬀerential eﬀects for wholly versus partially owned aﬃliates. CapRatio,
which is the share of aﬃliate capital owned by Japanese parent, is included to test the eﬀects of
ownership of aﬃliates on technology spillovers.
As for the dependent variable, we use patent citations at the USPTO, just as in Section 4.1. We
also use patent citations at the JPO for comparison. The correlations among explanatory variables
and the USPTO citations are presented in Table A2. As in Section 4.1, we employ the negative
binomial model for our estimation.
The estimated results are presented in Tables 6 to 9.18 Table 6 (Table 7) shows the results for
citations made (received) by Japanese parent ﬁrms to (from) the patents of host countries for the
subsample of developed economies. In both Tables 6 and 7, the coeﬃcients of PROX are signiﬁcantly
positive in all cases of citing and cited. These results conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Branstetter (2006).
The dummy Close reveals diﬀerent eﬀects on technology spillovers in the subsample of developed
economies. The coeﬃcients of Close are signiﬁcantly positive in technology spillovers from host
economies to Japanese MNEs (Table 6), which implies that Japanese parent companies cite more
patents of host economies when their aﬃliates run a business that is the same as or close to that of the
parents. However, this is not the case for technology spillovers from Japanese MNEs to host economies
17We aggregate the US patent classes into 44 ﬁelds derived by Schmoch et al.(2003).
18Here, we only report the estimated results with full sets of explanatory variables. The results with various combi-
nations of explanatory variables are available from the corresponding author upon request.
13(Table 7), since the coeﬃcients of Close are signiﬁcantly negative in the case of patent citations at
USPTO and are mostly insigniﬁcant in the case of patent citations at JPO. The ownership variable,
CapRatio, has positive coeﬃcients that are mostly signiﬁcant, which implies that a higher share of
ownership of foreign aﬃliates by Japanese parent companies tends to facilitate technology spillovers
in both directions between Japanese MNEs and their host economies.
The estimates of HFDI, VFDI, PHFDI,a n dPVFDI for USPTO give similar results to those
we observed in Table 3, except for PHFDI and PVFDI in the cited. The estimates for JPO, on the
other hand, indicate diﬀerent results in many cases. Although we do not report the results in detail
here, the signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of PVFDI is not robust for some combinations of explanatory
variables.
Table 8 (Table 9) shows the results for citations made (received) by Japanese parent ﬁrms to
(from) the patents of host countries for the subsample of developing economies. As in the case of
developed economies, the coeﬃcients of PROX are signiﬁcantly positive in all cases. The coeﬃcients
of CapRatio are signiﬁcantly positive for the case of USPTO, which is consistent with the result for
high-income host economies. However, in the case of citations at JPO, the coeﬃcients of CapRatio
are insigniﬁcant for the citing (Table 8) and signiﬁcantly negative for the cited (Table 9). Thus,
a higher share of foreign ownership may not always facilitate technology spillovers in developing
economies. Moreover, the coeﬃcients of Close are either insigniﬁcant or signiﬁcantly negative in
Tables 8 and 9, which suggests that when the host country is a developing economy, the closeness
of industrial classiﬁcation between parent companies and their foreign aﬃliates does not necessarily
facilitate technology spillovers. It may even hinder technology spillovers.
The estimates of HFDI, VFDI, PHFDI,a n dPVFDI in Tables 8 and 9 are basically consistent
with those in Table 3. That is, the signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient is only for PVFDI, though the
citing at the JPO does not conﬁrm this.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated how the structure of MNEs’ activity aﬀects technology spillovers
between MNEs and their host countries by using detailed ﬁrm-level data of Japanese MNEs and
patent citations data. We have proposed new speciﬁcations of FDI by using information on sales and
purchases of foreign aﬃliates of MNEs. We deﬁne pure horizontal FDI as FDI with a high share of
both purchase of intermediate inputs and sales of outputs in the local market. We also deﬁne pure
vertical FDI as FDI with a high share of transactions (i.e., both purchases of intermediate inputs
and sales of outputs) with the home country. Partially horizontal and partially vertical FDI are also
deﬁned.
We then found that when a developed country hosts Japanese MNEs, an increase in the degree of
14pure vertical FDI has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on technology spillovers as measured by patent ci-
tations, in both directions between the host country and Japanese MNEs. In contrast, pure horizontal
FDI has no signiﬁcant eﬀect or signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects on technology spillovers in either direction.
It is clear that vertical FDI between developed countries is not based on factor price diﬀerentials. It
may rather be motivated by utilizing technological advantage in the fragmented production process.
If investing ﬁrms and local ﬁrms have a technological advantage at diﬀerent stages of the production
process, technology spillovers in both directions could occur by specializing in the production stage
with technological advantages.
The results in this paper indicate that technology spillovers from FDI occur among developed
economies. In particular, vertical FDI plays an important role in technology spillovers. Thus, devel-
oped countries can gain knowledge ﬂow from MNEs’ activities both as the home country and as the
host country, when FDI involves the geographical fragmentation of the production process.
We also found that when the host country is a developing country, any types of FDI do not
have positive eﬀects on technology spillovers. One possible reason for this result is that we have
focused on technology spillovers measured by patent citations. Since patent applications must be
made to be counted as “spillovers,” indigenous ﬁrms in developing countries may not strongly beneﬁt
from technology spillovers in our deﬁnition. Another possible interpretation of the result is that it
reﬂects the stringency of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection in host countries. Branstetter,
Fisman, and Foley (2006) and Wakasugi and Ito (2009) ﬁnd that the stronger protection of IPRs in
host countries has a positive eﬀect on technology transfer from parent ﬁrms to their foreign aﬃliates.
Nagaoka (2009) also ﬁnds a positive eﬀect of stronger patent protection on expanding the scope
of the recipients of technology transfer. Taking these empirical ﬁndings into account, the weaker
protection of IPRs in developing countries in general may hinder technology spillovers from FDI in
our measurement.
Since our ﬁndings are based on Japanese MNEs’ data, we suggest testing whether our ﬁndings
could be applicable to other countries’ MNEs by examining detailed data of MNEs in other countries.
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Developing economies Developed economies excluding US US
mean of log no. of USPTO citing mean of log no. of USPTO cited
Source: The authors’ calculation from the METI survey.
Figure 1: USPTO Citations for Japanese MNEs (1995–2003)
20Table 1: Top 30 FDI Host Countries/Economies in 2000
Economy No. of aﬃliates Economy No. of aﬃliates Economy No. of aﬃliates
United States 2,172 Australia 342 India 99
China 1,246 Korea 257 Vietnam 97
Thailand 692 Netherlands 248 Belgium 80
Singapore 613 France 216 New Zealand 74
Hong Kong 585 Canada 196 Chile 42
United Kingdom 509 Brazil 193
Malaysia 477 Panama 138
Taiwan 460 Mexico 132
Indonesia 431 Italy 114
Germany 363 Spain 100
Note: The number of aﬃliates is those reported by respondents of the METI survey in 2000.
21Table 2: Sales and Purchases Ratios of Aﬃliates Abroad
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Developed Economies
ShSaHFDI 0.761 0.747 0.735 0.757 0.761 0.759 0.751 0.752 0.745
ShSaVFDI 0.128 0.125 0.126 0.127 0.126 0.122 0.124 0.106 0.107
ShPuHFDI 0.530 0.493 0.474 0.501 0.481 0.481 0.490 0.464 0.462
ShPuVFDI 0.403 0.398 0.405 0.413 0.424 0.421 0.420 0.404 0.403
Developing Economies
ShSaHFDI 0.655 0.649 0.612 0.639 0.644 0.636 0.630 0.631 0.631
ShSaVFDI 0.208 0.197 0.211 0.222 0.212 0.212 0.228 0.204 0.208
ShPuHFDI 0.524 0.482 0.464 0.512 0.494 0.493 0.509 0.530 0.536
ShPuVFDI 0.392 0.395 0.401 0.405 0.407 0.402 0.403 0.370 0.369
Source: The authors’ calculation from the METI survey data from 1995 to 2003.











LPHost 0.982∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗
(173.8) (181.6) (185.4) (175.1) (116.6) (119.4) (121.7) (114.5)
LPParent 0.963∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗
(184.5) (183.6) (185.2) (180.2) (181.1) (180.8) (183.3) (177.3)
No. of Obs 14836 14568 15441 14026 14836 14568 15441 14026
Log likelihood -24646 -24059 -25682 -23157 -33957 -33306 -35403 -32028










LPHost 1.095∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗
(48.6) (48.7) (49.0) (47.2) (54.7) (54.9) (54.9) (53.3)
LPParent 1.021∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗
(43.6) (43.8) (44.2) (42.5) (48.5) (48.6) (49.1) (48.0)
No. of Obs 18928 18870 19345 18397 18928 18870 19345 18397
Log likelihood -3836 -3917 -3988 -3755 -5732 -5795 -5919 -5604
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: (1) “***,” “**” and “*” denote 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcant level.
(2) The values in the parentheses are t-statistics.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table A1: List of Countries/Economies
Group I Group II (Developing Economies)
(Developed Economies)
Australia Argentina Ghana Niger Trinidad&Tobago
Austria Bahamas Greece Nigeria Tunisia
Belgium Bahrain Guatemala Pakistan Turkey
Canada Bangladesh Hong Kong Panama United Arab Emirates
Denmark Bolivia Hungary Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Finland Brazil Iceland Paraguay Venezuela
France Brunei India Peru Vietnam
Germany Cambodia Indonesia Poland Zambia
Israel Cameroon Iran Portugal Zimbabwe
Italy Chile Ireland Qatar
Korea, Republic of China Jamaica Romania
Luxembourg Colombia Kenya Russia
Netherlands Costa Rica Kuwait Samoa
New Zealand Cyprus Laos Saudi Arabia
Norway Czech Lebanon Senegal
Spain Dominican Liberia Singapore
Sweden Ecuador Macao Slovak
Switzerland Egypt Madagascar South Africa
Taiwan El Salvador Malaysia Sri Lanka
United Kingdom Ethiopia Mexico Tanzania
United States Fiji Morocco Thailand
30Table A2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Developed Economies
USPTO Citing 50736 74.92 463.73 0 7039
USPTO Cited 50736 190.20 1052.32 0 13484
JPO Citing 50736 13.00 60.67 0 813
JPO Cited 50736 24.58 122.04 0 1806
HFDI 20872 0.34 0.38 0.00 1.00
VFD I 20623 0.02 0.10 0.00 1.00
PHFDI 21757 0.33 0.36 0.00 1.00
PVFDI 19798 0.07 0.21 0.00 1.00
LPHost(USPTO) 50736 6.36 7.27 -9.21 12.09
LPParent(USPTO) 50736 -4.38 6.53 -9.21 8.16
PROX(USPTO) 24480 0.37 0.19 0.00 0.96
LPHost(JPO) 50736 8.43 1.67 3.22 10.12
LPParent(JPO) 50736 0.41 6.80 -9.21 9.62
PROX(JPO) 39060 0.39 0.20 0.00 0.94
CapRatio 45262 0.90 0.22 0.00 1.00
Close 50736 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
LDist 50736 9.09 0.50 7.05 9.29
LCost 25901 1.63 0.97 -5.54 9.53
LGDP 50736 21.75 1.36 18.07 23.27
Developing Economies
USPTO Citing 63445 0.39 5.59 0 218
USPTO Cited 63445 0.91 11.85 0 444
JPO Citing 63445 0.06 0.53 0 20
JPO Cited 63445 0.66 7.10 0 244
HFDI 28664 0.33 0.37 0.00 1.00
VFD I 28834 0.08 0.20 0.00 1.00
PHFDI 29494 0.23 0.31 0.00 1.00
PVFDI 27914 0.10 0.22 0.00 1.00
LPHost(USPTO) 63445 -0.34 6.50 -9.21 8.58
LPParent(USPTO) 63445 -5.22 6.25 -9.21 8.16
PROX(USPTO) 26312 0.29 0.24 0.00 0.99
LPHost(JPO) 63445 2.72 3.77 -9.21 7.53
LPParent(JPO) 63445 -0.37 7.02 -9.21 9.62
PROX(JPO) 45431 0.35 0.22 0.00 0.96
CapRatio 57244 0.76 0.28 0.00 1.00
Close 63445 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
LDist 63445 8.35 0.64 7.65 9.83
LCost 34377 -0.21 1.45 -8.65 7.94
LGDP 63445 20.26 1.64 12.62 23.00
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